By Peter Campion

The two major risks to the electricity grid

Everything that 26.5 million Australians rely on for their daily existence in turn relies on electricity as a dependable and continual service. Electricity is not a product. We can’t simply go to the shops, buy two days’ worth of electricity, tuck it under our arm, and head home. It’s a service that we’ve come to expect to be available at our homes and businesses at the precise moment we flick that switch. Our entire economy and society are structured around electricity being a service reliably delivered exactly when required.

Queensland Labor Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk getting rid of reliable and cheap coal fired power stations, replacing them with wind tower generators and solar panels which are proving to be the greatest non-disposable environmental hazards ever seen in Australia. Under the ALP plan a vast, myriad of expensive high voltage power lines will criss-cross the state over valuable farm land, towns and suburbs like a tangled spider web exposing humans and animals to massive doses of EMF.

When electricity supply is interrupted for a few seconds or minutes we are merely inconvenienced, but blackouts lasting several hours have a significant impact – particularly for the sick and the elderly who rely on electricity being available at all times to keep complex health issues stable. This is why hospitals and care homes have emergency generators.

Longer blackouts cause increasing problems, but few people take the time to consider the escalation of these issues over days or weeks. These problems vary in impact depending on the geographic location of those affected. Most Australians live in our major cities, and that’s where the impacts will be greatest. That’s why grid managers work hard to avoid blackouts affecting cities, particularly areas including high-rise towers which are totally dependent on reliable electricity for access and ventilation.

The blackouts most of us have experienced are almost always local distribution equipment failures or load-shedding, during which the main electricity grid and its phase-locked baseload generators, fuelled by hydrocarbons or by falling water, are still functioning normally and supplying electricity across most of the network. None of us have experienced a full blackout of the entire grid – called a “system black” event.

The closest to a system black event that modern Australia has experienced was the statewide blackout in South Australia in September 2016. Storms brought down a powerline, which caused other powerlines to trip out. That resulted in voltage dips which triggered protective equipment at inverter-based generators (wind farms) to isolate them and that in turn overloaded the interconnector to Victoria’s hydrocarbon-fuelled power plants. That crashed the grid for 1.7 million people.

Authorities rebooting the SA section of the east coast grid claimed they’d achieved a world first “black start”, but it wasn’t that at all as it was enabled by the return of stable, synchronous electricity from Victoria’s hydrocarbon-fuelled power plants. That allowed SA’s small gas turbine generators to rejoin the grid and eventually the asynchronous inverter-based generators (solar and wind) could be added back in. Solar and wind cannot achieve a black start as they can’t initiate the stable frequency required (50Hz) and can’t be dialed up as needed to keep demand and supply matched as consumer areas are reconnected.

What would our society look like over the course of the first week of a major system black event affecting the entire east coast grid? A system black event that was triggered by one of the two major risks listed later in this article could take months or years to rectify, but the first week will wreak the most havoc.

When the power goes down, properly maintained emergency generators will start automatically in many larger buildings and some private homes. However, their fuel supplies are finite and, in most cases, will be exhausted in less than 24 hours. Refills won’t be available as service stations don’t usually have emergency generators and so won’t be able to pump or sell fuel.

The battery back-ups on mobile phone towers and emergency lighting systems will run flat in 12 to 24 hours.

Streetlights and traffic signals are commonly grid-dependent and will cease operating at the commencement of the blackout. City streets will quickly become gridlocked, impairing residents’ ability to evacuate by car.

Telephone and internet networks’ batteries and emergency generators will stop working within 24 hours, making it impossible to request assistance from police, fire, and ambulance services. In the absence of street lighting and law enforcement, crime will skyrocket. Only well-trained, armed citizens will enjoy any personal safety.

Tap water won’t be available as city water reticulation relies on pumps. Drinking water will only be available as bottled water on hand as shops won’t be open. No piped water means no toilet flushing, and hygiene issues will emerge within 24 hours.

No rubbish collection will see waste accumulating on the streets by day two. The insect and rodent populations will flourish and contribute to health issues.

Refrigerated food will be spoiled by day two and food supplies will be limited to tinned or dried food on hand.

Health services can be expected to collapse on day two and hospitals will descend into chaos. Those reliant on prescription drugs will have only their on-hand stocks.

On day three, city residents will be desperate for water and urgently in need of food. Those who have not become victims of crime will be evacuating outwards from the city centre on foot, hoping to find water and food in the suburbs.

Things won’t be much better in the suburbs, except that residents with yards will at least be able to bury their waste and the roads won’t be as gridlocked. Suburban residents will also be without water, food, and communications, and by the end of day three, with desperate city residents flooding their neighbourhoods, they’ll be taking to their cars and fleeing into the rural areas.

Most city and suburban residents assume food can always be found in rural areas when in fact it is mostly stored in urban warehouses. Very few city or suburban residents have the skills or knowledge to find food in the bush. Food in farming areas will mainly exist as livestock or immature crops. Very few city or suburban residents have the tools, skills, or knowledge to kill, clean and prepare livestock for consumption – and taking livestock without consent will invite deadly responses from armed farmers.

By the fourth day of a grid-black event, the death toll from crime is likely to be hundreds of thousands. The death toll from thirst will be in the millions.

By the end of the first week of a system black event, disease will be rife due to the masses of dead lying rotting in the streets and the complete breakdown of healthcare. Those who survived the initial exodus from the cities and suburbs and who found a source of food and water will be at risk from disease spread by insects and rodents.

What can cause a system black event across the entire grid? There are two major risks. The first is government policy.

Our globalist-controlled corporate governments are hell-bent on eliminating our heavy-duty hydrocarbon-fuelled generators that can operate indefinitely with adequate fuel and maintenance. They’re rushing to replace them with light-duty wind- and solar-powered generators that only operate when it’s windy or sunny and which have comparatively short lifespans. We’re one or possibly two coal-fired power plant closures away from a system black that cannot be reversed except by isolating small areas in the vicinity of hydrocarbon-fuelled generators from the rest of the grid and only powering those. Even that option can only work while the fuel supplies last. Diesel fuels power coal-mining machinery and a system black will interrupt the diesel supply chain.

In a government-policy system black, we can expect Chinese troops in blue UN helmets to arrive in week two because this is what is being engineered by the globalists and their co-conspirators in our governments.

The second major threat to electricity as a continual service is large solar flares, which are inevitable in our electromagnetic universe.

Solar flare

Solar flares the size of the 1859 Carrington Event, an X50 flare, which burnt out the telegraph system of the time, occur every 150-200 years. 1859 was 164 years ago. We’re due an X50 flare at any time. An X50 or higher solar flare will energise Earth’s ionospheric and terrestrial electrical currents to the extent that every transformer and generator on the planet will overload and burn out. The return of electricity as a service would then be measured in generations, not years.

Larger flares occur on longer timescales. We don’t know when the larger events in the past occurred because our pre-industrial society wasn’t electrified, however, in the satellite era we can calculate when the next X100 to X1000 flare is due, and indications are that it will be between the late 2030s and the late 2040s.

No amount of planning and preparation can save an operating grid from X50-plus flares, but replacement equipment could be being stockpiled for the same money we’re squandering on wind and solar.

The primary responsibility of policymakers must be to ensure electricity remains a dependable and continual service to prevent a mass die-off of Australians. Our policymakers have enacted legislation that ratchets renewables content up over time, which will inevitably lead to a system black event. They aren’t considering solar flares at all.

A mass die-off of Australians is now inevitable because our staggeringly negligent and/or criminally complicit policymakers failed to learn enough about basic electrical engineering and astrophysics or have sold us out to the globalists.