By Alexandra Bruce
This viral video put out by ConciousJooseTwo on TikTok illustrates the horrifying dystopia of the 6G sensor network-AI-CBDC-social credit system already being used against the Chinese people by their government.
By framing it as a “Palantir ad”, one becomes hopeful that Palantir is saying they’d protect us from such an abuse of this technology – but this is definitely not a Palantir advertisement and the unfettered interoperability of AI with databases, spyware and the Internet of Things develops apace.
University of Toronto Professor Emeritus and 2024 Nobel Physics Prize Laureate, Sir Geoffrey Hinton, known as “the Godfather of AI” resigned from Google Brain in 2023, citing concerns about the risks of AI technology, especially if co-opted by malicious entities. He estimated a 10% to 20% risk that AI could contribute to human extinction within the next 30 years.
According to Sabrina Wallace, the process to control humanity with AI is well underway in the West, via the 5G and 6G sensor networks of the Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN), which she claims have already connected each of our biofields as “nodes” or “devices” to the Cloud (i.e., Internet of Things) in the name of “National Security”. When Catherine Austin Fitts says, “They want to connect you to the Cloud,” this is what she’s talking about. It is not Tinfoil Hat. At the 2022 meeting of the World Economic Forum, Nokia CEO, Pekka Lundmark publicly declared that by 2030, the most common interface of Smartphone technology will be “built directly” into the physical body and that by then, cellphones will be virtually obsolete.
This technology is actively being developed and refined by the major telecom companies, Nokia, Ericsson and Bell Labs, with the EU’s Hexa-X Project.
In a July podcast, Sabrina claimed that the technology using these communications networks, to literally “log into” your biofield is called “Q” or “Pegasus“. This cellphone spyware is owned by an Israeli technology group that includes NSO, Q Cyber Technologies and OSY Technologies, where Lt Gen Mike Flynn was an Advisory Board Member for seven months in 2016.
Back in a September 2022 podcast, Tore Maras said that this spyware was datamining the cellphones of everybody on the planet and that it was controlled by the Knights of Malta. However, Tore never said anything about this technology logging into anybody’s biofields.
Roughly 39 minutes into the above podcast, she described Pegasus/Q Cybertechnologies as mostly AI-driven spyware that has datamined all of us, including the Globalists in a “sting operation” for their crimes and that “they had all been caught”.
Tore said:
“And that software was incredible, because it was able to mine all the crimes that they have done and I am so grateful for that…I am so grateful that the Knights actually thought of that; that people were against what the Pope [Benedict] was doing, by lining up with this New World Order and that Ancient Order [Knights of Malta] decided ‘Uh-uh’.”
Tore says Q was created right after General Flynn’s team was in charge of going after Julian Assange and Edward Snowden and she says that we should thank General Flynn for protecting Assange by being in the middle of it, saying, “He had people like Cassandra Fairbanks and other assets that he hired in the media…
“And just so you know, the DIA’s task force ended on the 17th of October of 2017. When did Q post? Right then.
“And you know what? All these losers that you see, telling you about Q? They’re run under McChrystal’s People First company. That’s how they’re paid. I have receipts!”
In short, what Tore was saying here that Q, as in “QAnon” refers to this spyware and she was deriding “Q decoders” as being on the payroll of PeopleFirst, an online influencer talent agency that is a front for a group of Democratic Party AI tech/strategy/lobbying companies.
Today, Tore posted the following report from the cybesecurity firm, Lookout about how Pegasus spyware works and I found it very interesting – as should everybody who owns a cellphone – to see how all of this technology works together to implement the Control Grid.
This is a great article for anyone who wants to know how their cellphones are being exploited by Pegasus, which has the ability to grab all of the input and output of your phone, to be used as an audio and video recorder or as NSO’s co-founder, Omri Lavie told the Financial Times, “Your smartphone today is the new walkie-talkie.”
Don’t be intimidated by all of the code in the illustrations, just read this to understand how Pegasus exfiltrates messages, calls, emails, logs, passwords, audio files and more from apps including Gmail, Facetime, Facebook, WhatsApp, Skype, Telegram, Mail.Ru, WeChat and many others.

Technical Analysis of Pegasus Spyware: An Investigation Into Highly Sophisticated Espionage Software
by Max Bazaliy, Michael Flossman, Andrew Blaich, Seth Hardy, Kristy Edwards, Mike Murray, of Lookout
Executive Summary
This report is an in-depth technical look at a targeted espionage attack being actively leveraged against an undetermined number of mobile users around the world. Lookout researchers have done deep analysis on a live iOS sample of the malware, detailed in this report. Citizen Lab’s investigation links the software and
infrastructure to that of NSO Group which offers a product called Pegasus solution. Pegasus is professionally developed and highly advanced in its use of zero-day vulnerabilities, code obfuscation, and encryption. It uses sophisticated function hooking to subvert OS- and application-layer security in voice/audio calls and apps including Gmail, Facebook, WhatsApp, Facetime, Viber, WeChat, Telegram, Apple’s built-in messaging and email apps, and others. It steals the victim’s contact list and GPS location, as well as personal, Wi-Fi, and router passwords stored on the device. The iOS version of the attack uses what we refer to as Trident, an exploit of three related zero-day vulnerabilities in iOS, which Apple patched in iOS 9.3.5, available as of the publishing of this report.
According to news reports, NSO Group sells weaponized software that targets mobile phones to governments and has been operating since 2010, according to its LinkedIn page. The Pegasus spyware has existed for a significant amount of time, and is advertised and sold for use on high-value targets for multiple purposes, including high-level espionage on iOS, Android, and Blackberry.
This spyware is extremely sophisticated and modular, in addition to allowing customization. It uses strong encryption to protect itself from detection by traditional security tools and has a vigorous monitoring and self-destruct mechanism. Lookout’s analysis determined that the malware exploits three zero-day vulnerabilities, Trident, in Apple’s iOS:
1. CVE-2016-4657: Memory Corruption in WebKit – A vulnerability in Safari WebKit allows the attacker to compromise the device when the user clicks on a link.
2. CVE-2016-4655: Kernel Information Leak – A kernel base mapping vulnerability that leaks information to the attacker that allows him to calculate the kernel’s location in memory.
3. CVE-2016-4656: Kernel Memory corruption leads to Jailbreak – 32 and 64 bit iOS kernel-level vulnerabilities that allow the attacker to silently jailbreak the device and install surveillance software.
The attack sequence begins with a simple phishing scheme: send a text (or Twitter or other type of) message with a benign-looking URL, user clicks on link, open web browser, load page, exploit a browser or operating system vulnerability, install software to gather information and to ensure that the software stays installed on the device (“persistence”). As soon as the targeted victim clicks the link, the attack occurs silently, with no indication to the user or device administrators that anything has occurred or that any new processes are running.
The Pegasus software is highly configurable: depending on the country of use and feature sets purchased by the user of the spyware, the surveillance capabilities include remotely accessing text messages, iMessages, calls, emails, logs, and more from apps including Gmail, Facebook, Skype, WhatsApp, Viber, Facetime, Calendar, Line, Mail.Ru, WeChat, Surespot, Tango, Telegram, and others.
Based on artifacts in the code, this spyware has been in the wild for more than two years. The exploits have configuration settings that go all the way back to iOS 7, which was released in 2013 and superseded in 2014.
Pegasus takes advantage of how integrated mobile devices are in our lives and the combination of features only available on mobile — always connected (WiFi, 3G/4G), voice communications, camera, email, messaging, GPS, passwords, and contact lists. As a result of its functional modularity, the breadth of communications and user data it monitors, and the tailored methods it instruments into other applications to exfiltrate data from them, to date, Pegasus is the most sophisticated privately-developed attack Lookout has encountered on a mobile endpoint. It hooks into widely used secure messenger applications to copy cleartext data out of them before the user’s app can encrypt and send it. From the perspective of the user and the people they’re communicating with, their communications are secure, while the administrator of the Pegasus instance has secretly intercepted the clear text of their communication. Pegasus carries a high price tag averaging at over $25,000 per target. In at least one instance, NSO Group sold 300 licenses for $8 million USD.
This report presents the technical details of the attack from the beginning of the exploit chain to the end. It includes analysis of the Trident zero-day iOS vulnerabilities that the toolkit was using to jailbreak the phone. We also look in-depth at the components of the espionage software, and have exposed the type of capabilities that an advanced mobile attacker using this software possesses.
Trident (the vulnerabilities disclosed in coordination with this report) were present in the latest versions of iOS, up to iOS 9.3.4, the latest iOS version as of August 2016 when we made these discoveries. Researchers from Lookout and Citizen Lab responsibly disclosed the exploits and their related vulnerabilities to Apple. Given the severity of Trident, Apple worked extremely quickly to patch these vulnerabilities and has released iOS 9.3.5 to address them. With the release of the patched OS, we are publishing the technical details of the attack and exploits.
Background
As mobile phones continue to be tightly integrated into our personal and work lives, malicious actors are actively creating sophisticated applications that can run on victims’ devices without either their knowledge of the threat’s presence, or of the actors’ intent. This can be seen in the diversity of threats that target mobile devices: from those that are financially motivated, such as adware, banking trojans, and SMS fraud, to those seeking personal information or corporate intellectual property. Spyware, a malicious application designed to retrieve specific information from an infected device without the victim’s knowledge, falls into the latter camp.
Spyware applications often include the ability to extract a victim’s SMS messages, contact details, record their calls, access their call logs, or remotely activate a device’s microphone and camera to surreptitiously capture audio, video, and image content. In addition to these rich features, some spyware also has the equally important ability to remotely deliver the malicious application to a target device. This is a complex and technically challenging problem, as evidenced by the amount of money private security firms and corporate bug bounty programs pay for zero-day exploits that facilitate this remote delivery.
Two private security firms, Gamma Group and Hacking Team, both made headlines after media outlets revealed that the organizations developed mobile surveillance software that has been sold to oppressive governments. These products are often very expensive and generally only accessible to well-funded attackers given the complexity involved in creating this kind of mobile spyware, and the fact that it includes zero-day exploits.
The Israeli based NSO Group has managed to avoid the spotlight of the cyber security community despite being in operation for over five years. Founded in 2010 by Niv Carmi, Shalev Hulio, and Omri Lavie, NSO Group has publicly stated that it develops and sells mobile phone surveillance software to governments around the world. It has claimed that its surveillance capability is undetectable with one of the founders stating, “We’re a complete ghost.” Private equity firm Francisco Partners acquired NSO Group in 2014 for $110 million. The founders of NSO Group play in both the cyber offense and defense spaces, having also founded the mobile security company Kaymera.
Disclosure Timeline
Citizen Lab reported the existence of the malware to Lookout on August 12, 2016. Lookout and Citizen Lab worked together to analyze the software and attempt to determine the severity of the vulnerabilities and the capabilities of the malware until August 15, 2016 when we reported the information to Apple.
The three organizations worked together from August 15, 2016 to the release of the vulnerability patches in iOS 9.3.5 on August 25, 2016.
Attack Overview
The attack is very simple in its delivery and silent in delivering its payload. The attack starts when the attacker sends a website URL (through SMS, email, social media, or any other message) to an identified target. The user only has to take one action–click on the link. Once the user clicks the link, the software silently carries out a series of exploits against the victim’s device to remotely jailbreak it so that the espionage software packages can be installed. The user’s only indication that anything happened will be that the browser closes after the link is clicked.
The espionage software contains malicious code, processes, and apps that are used to spy, collect data, and report back what the user does on the device. This spyware can access and exfiltrate messages, calls, emails, logs, and more from apps including, but not limited to: Gmail, Facetime, Facebook, Line, Mail.Ru, Calendar, WeChat, Surespot, Tango, WhatsApp, Viber, Skype, Telegram, KakaoTalk.


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How does One think Companies through commercial administration (commerce) are able to trespass on man/woman/childs natural evolutionary God created (46 chromosome) biology?
Do any remember He-man and Skeletor?
https://odysee.com/@Psinergy:a/Human-Augmentation:9
ht tps://m.youtube.com/watch?v=MJl-fDocmwc
Crickets again!!!
It is recommended that peopel search the Australian Communications and Media Authority on ASIC’s ABN Lookup to find that ACMA is actually a business operating under an ABN, meaning it is a corporation.
You could also look up AFCA, the Banking authority, to find that it is a limited company, both of the above meaning that these are not lawful government departments.
And then you can contact your local federal member and ask them WTF is going on here?
Attention Frankly, I thank you verily, many times over, for this info, most sincerely. Yet it is a bit beyond my brain to comprehend the actuality of the legal meaning & interpretation so I will ask my brainiac friend. Or if someone smarter than me such as perhaps the Editor can please comment – will it be possible to be legally allowed to opt out of a digital ID as I do not understand what Frankly has copied above & often what appears in print means the opposite ie I do not trust Government jargon. Thanks.
The digital ID act is in, so everyone should be made aware that it is Voluntary and anyone trying to coerce you into this digital imprisonment has to by law offer you an alternative unprejudiced method of identification if you decline digital entrapment. Sect 74 explains in detail the obligations of Government and service providers.

DIGITAL ID ACT 2024 (NO. 25, 2024) – SECT 74
Creating and using a digital ID is voluntary
Creating and using a digital ID is voluntary
(1) A participating relying party must not, as a condition of providing a service or access to a service, require an individual to create or use a digital ID.
Note: The effect of this subsection is that a participating relying party that provides a service, or access to a service, must provide another means of accessing that service that does not involve the creation or use of a digital ID through the Australian Government Digital ID System.
(1A) A participating relying party is taken to contravene subsection (1) if:
(a) the participating relying party provides the service, or access to the service, by means other than the creation or use of a digital ID through the Australian Government Digital ID System; and
(b) either of the following apply:
(i) the other means is not reasonably accessible;
(ii) using the other means results in the service being provided on substantially less favourable terms.
Exceptions
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to a service of a participating relying party if:
(a) the service provides access to another service; and
(b) the individual can access the other service by means other than the creation or use of a digital ID through the Australian Government Digital ID System; and
(c) the other means is reasonably accessible; and
(d) using the other means does not result in the other service being provided on substantially less favourable terms.
Example: To open a bank account, ABC Bank requires new customers to verify their identity. ABC Bank allows customers to do this in person at each branch of ABC Bank or alternatively by using the bank’s online application service, which requires the use of a digital ID. Jacob wants to open a bank account with ABC Bank but he does not wish to use his digital ID to do so. Because Jacob can verify his identity by going to his nearest branch instead, ABC Bank does not contravene subsection (1).
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply if:
(a) the participating relying party is providing a service, or access to a service, to an individual who is acting on behalf of another entity in a professional or business capacity; or
(b) the participating relying party holds an exemption under subsection (4).
Exemptions
(4) Subject to subsection (6), the Digital ID Regulator may, on application by a participating relying party, grant an exemption under this subsection to the participating relying party if the Digital ID Regulator is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so.
Note: See Part 5 of Chapter 9 for matters relating to applications.
(4A) In deciding whether to grant an exemption under subsection (4), the Digital ID Regulator must have regard to whether granting the exemption in relation to the participating relying party’s service would unduly undermine access to services of that kind.
(5) Without limiting subsection (4), the Digital ID Regulator may be satisfied that it is appropriate to grant an exemption if:
(a) the participating relying party is a small business (within the meaning of the Privacy Act 1988 ); or
(b) the participating relying party provides services, or access to services, solely online; or
(c) the participating relying party is providing services, or access to services, in exceptional circumstances.
(6) However, the Digital ID Regulator must not grant an exemption under subsection (4) to a participating relying party that is:
(a) a Commonwealth entity, or a Commonwealth company, within the meaning of the Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 ; or
(b) a person or body that is an agency within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 ; or
(c) a body specified, or the person holding an office specified, in Part I of Schedule 2 to the Freedom of Information Act 1982 .
(7) An exemption under subsection (4):
(a) must be in writing; and
(b) may be revoked by the Digital ID Regulator if the Digital ID Regulator considers it appropriate to do so.
(8) The Digital ID Regulator must:
(a) give written notice of a decision to grant, or to refuse to grant, the exemption to the participating relying party; and
(b) if the decision is to refuse to grant the exemption–give reasons for the decision to the participating relying party.
Whatever Lundmark says, I would personally take it with a pinch of salt. These types live in a largely academic environment. Go to the ‘penny stocks’ indices of your local economy and you’ll find tens of thousands of these Lundmark types with their fancy avant-garde tech products. Lots of cool videos, plenty of yack, plenty of share dilution, but do they ever deliver their fancy goods? – nah!, just eternal yack to keep the long suffering shareholders sweet until the next AGM.
If one cares to think about it, AI is actually a form of human-computer interface that is already operational. In this case, the human mind interfaces with the computer simply by speaking to its AI-agent. The AI-agent then does the rest.
AI is where its going, it was inevitable, its unstoppable, and that’s just how it is. If people were too stupid to recognise the Industrial Revolution of their own age and act accordingly, that was their choice, and thus, their problem.
A couple of weeks ago I was chatting to a mate about the AI economy. He makes music videos for bands, so he showed me his latest work, which was typically awesome. He then explained that the video was AI generated, all he did was splice the images together. In the past he created the imagery himself, so he’s now been replaced in that area. He’s says he’s got about two years max, until AI works out how to splice the images together, then his career is over, he’s been completely replaced.
I was telling him years ago this would happen, and he should invest into the underlying financial infrastructure of the AI economy. That would ultimately protect him from his inevitable loss of career, but like everyone else, he ignored it, thought it was a ponzi, thought it wasn’t real, thought it was hot air, etc. Its now too late for him: he’s just been replaced by a hugely cheaper model, and he cannot retrain within a similar field of expertise, as those jobs are going the same way.
And the AI Revolution has barely even begun.
For this millionaire mate, the AI economy is now out of reach for him. He refused to act upon good advice in 2023-2024, so he’s now been out-priced from ever entering this economy, and he’s now been replaced by an AI-agent that’s entirely dependent upon this economy. If he’d acted more rationally, the AI-agent that has just taken his job, and livelihood, would now be his bread-winner: an economic slave whose every digital micro-action syphons money out of the real economy into the cyber economy, – and those intelligent enough to own a stake in it.
AI-agents are the new renter class to the new rentier class of cyberspace. Those relying upon AI-agents for their income, will be a sub-renter class, as in sub-leasing cyberspace from the AI-agents.
In 2024, we watched the one to two million dollar net worthers priced out. This year the cyber-economy moved up a gear, which is why we’re starting to see the pricing out of the five to ten million net worthers. Most of these will be priced out over the next three years, then it’ll be the ten to twenty million net worthers turn, and so on.
At this stage, the five to ten million net worthers need to get 24% of their portfolios invested, otherwise they’ll be outpriced also. Most will fail, as they won’t have sufficient time to satisfactorily understand the asset prior to committing the relevant investment sum.
The cyber-economy will soon be untouchable.
President Fink and M understood this better than anyone
The Tiktok video spells it out, the future is Orwellian and it has already arrived, they are pushing everyone to use their card or phone for purchases and people love it, they are like little piggies running into the abattoir.
People have already made themselves redundant without AI, because so many jobs involve “administration” of others who do not need very much administration and interference. The banksters have skewed the economy away from production and towards speculation, but their model won’t work when their customers become non-viable. Everything useful is being dismantled and now AI will come in and destroy lawyers and accountants who up to now thrived on all the nonsense created in Canberra.
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